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Abstract
This article outlines and discusses the research on UNSC reform. The interdisciplin-
ary field of UNSC reform research can be placed into two broad categories and four 
sub categories, each indicating the degree to which scholars believe in the benefits of 
either structural or working methods reform. These include topics such as legitimacy 
and efficiency and the question of (un)equal representation. The role of The Global 
South will feature heavily in analyses of how best to reform the UNSC, and of which 
actors or structures mainly prevent a reform from materialising. There has been a sig-
nificant gap in research focusing on how the factors that feature as instruments of 
opposition, e.g. the presented benefits and detriments of the different approaches to 
reform, can potentially be converged to rethink the direction of the research.
Keywords
United Nations Security Council – United Nations reform – international relations – 
international politics – history
1 Introduction
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform is one of the primary issues 
facing not only the council itself, but the entire field of international secu-
rity, international relations, and the functioning of the international system 
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at-large.1 The issue of reform is also one of the United Nations’ (UN) “great-
est challenges wherein all the difficulties and obstacles of wider institutional 
reform are collected together in a microcosm”,2 and “is regarded by many inside 
and outside the UN as the most important and urgent issue of UN reform […]”.3 
UN member states have debated reform since the UN’s inception. This debate 
has recently been outlined by Bourantonnis, Blum, Swart & Freiesleben, and 
Gowan & Gordon.4 Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to a full review 
outlining the academic debate about UNSC reform,5 while exploring its under-
lying modes of thinking.
This article describes the academic debate’s historical backdrop and exam-
ines more recent contributions to the topic, thereby illustrating that research 
in support of structural reform of the UNSC has gradually moved from being 
the prevailing emphasis toward taking up a smaller share of the dialogue. 
Consequently, a discrepancy exists between the debates among UN mem-
ber states, where calls for structural reform make up the majority,6 and the 
1   Jakkie Cilliers, “Global Trends Analysis,” 2018; Sabine Hassler, Reforming the UN Security 
Council Membership (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013); Kai Schaefer, “Reforming the United 
Nations Security Council: Feasibility or Utopia?,” International Negotiation 22, no. 1 (2017): 
62–91, https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341348.
2   Sven Bernhard Gareis, The United Nations An Introduction (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012), 256.
3   Karen A Mingst and Margaret P Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century, United Nations 
in the Twenty-First Century, 3rd ed., Dilemmas in World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview 
Press, 2007), 242.
4   Dimitris Bourantonis, “The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform,” Security, 
2005, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203335390; Yehuda Z Blum, “Proposals for UN Security 
Council Reform,” American Journal of International Law 99, no. 3 (2005): 632–49; Lydia 
Swart and Jonas von Freiesleben, Security Council Reform from 1945 to September 2013, 1st ed. 
(New York, NY: Center for U.N. Reform Education, 2013); Richard Gowan and Nora Gordon, 
“Pathways to Security Council Reform,” Center on International Cooperation, no. May (2014): 39.
5   Bourantonnis’ endnotes, Volacu’s introductory description of how his article connects to 
the strands of UNSC reform inputs, and Nadin’s ‘select bibliography’—are the best exam-
ples of overviews, but neither of these sufficiently covers the lay of the land. Moreover, Luck 
also mentions the influence of academia as being an important, yet understudied aspect 
of SC-reform Edward C. Luck, “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History 
in Progress,” International Organizations and the Future, no. 1 (2003): 48, http://dspace 
.cigilibrary.org/jspui/handle/123456789/5935.
6   Saksena (1993) claims that one-hundred-and-seventy-five member states have expressed 
a desire for a UNSC that structurally reflects today’s world, and Zacher writes that “A con-
siderable majority of UN members support an increase in permanent and non-permanent 
members, but the regional neighbours of some perspective members [the UfC] and some 
small states oppose the addition of permanent members” Mark W Zacher, “The Conundrums 
of International Power Sharing: The Politics of Security Council Reform,” in The United 
Nations and Global Security, ed. Richard M Price and Mark W Zacher (New York: Palgrave 
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academic literature covering the topic. Subsequently, more research is needed 
to help explain this inclination.
The article does not propose that scholars are obliged to direct their 
research to fit with the interests of nation states. However, research that covers 
an issue which significantly impacts global security must be attentive to the 
preferences of nation states. The arena of UN studies, expanding many fields, 
is closely tied to the diplomatic arena within the UN.7 For this reason, scholars 
should be careful not to drive a wedge between the production of knowledge 
in academia and the application of knowledge in diplomatic circles. This is 
particularly important if academics want to maintain the possibility of influ-
encing global governance and policy creation. Weiss & Wilkinson8 argue that 
there are several factors to consider regarding what contributes to policy cre-
ation and global governance. As a result of the mentioned interlinkage between 
UN-academia and UN-diplomacy, I am adding the UNSC reform debate to that 
list. Nevertheless, more research is needed to document precisely how these 
implied connections function. Finally, I propose that the task for UNSC reform 
Macmillan, 2004), 217. However, as Swart (2015) has pointed out, the extent of support for any 
particular frame of structural reform is uncertain.
7   Edward C. Luck and Thomas G. Weiss both have professional UN attachments on their CV’s. 
Colin Keating was president of the UN General Assembly in 1994–1995 and Mahbubnani has 
held the UNSC presidency on two occasions during his work as Singapore’s permanent rep. 
to the UN. Thakur was once Assistant Secretary-General at the UN. Daws, Fassbender, and 
Nadin have also worked for the UN. Moreover, as has been pointed out by Fred Iklé, within 
multilateral negotiations bonds between the involved persons emerge, as well as cultures of 
negotiation. This common intellectual culture leads to a shared set of concepts and a com-
mon vocabulary and understanding Fred Charles Iklé, “Role of Emotions in International 
Negotiations,” in International Negotiation. Actors, Structure/Process, Values, ed. Peter Berton, 
Hiroshi Kimura, and William Zartman (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 335–50. 
The diplomatic and academic debates about UNSC reform both appear to fit with Iklé’s 
descriptions of the concerning intellectual culture and vocabulary. This becomes apparent 
for anyone who has had the time to read up on the scholarly literature as well as the state-
ments and resolution proposals from the countries and alliance groups that are active in the 
debate. Again, my focus is not to prove the linkage between academia and diplomacy or how 
one arena affects the other. What I point out is, that since academics involved in the debate 
clearly write with the aim of influencing the process, it is fair to consider how the writings 
from academia might impact the process. James A Paul’s brief exposition of the interlinkage 
between journalists, NGO’s, think tanks, and the diplomatic realm can also be used to sup-
port my argument James A Paul, Of Foxes and Chickens—Oligarchy and Global Power in the 
UN Security Council (New York, NY: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2017), 147ff.
8   Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, “The Globally Governed—Everyday Global 
Governance,” Global Governance 24, no. 2 (2018): 193–210, http://search.ebscohost.com/login 
.aspx?direct=true&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.glogo24.18&site=eds-live.
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research going forward is to explore new approaches so that the academic 
debate avoids becoming as gridlocked as the one among UN member states.
1.1 What Is UNSC Reform?
Structural reform refers to charter amendment(s), e.g., change in the coun-
cil’s membership structure or delegation of the veto prerogative. On the other 
hand, working methods reform can be agreed on within the UNSC without 
charter amendments, as the council, according to article 30 of the UN charter, 
is master of its procedures.9
Working methods reform has been branded as the feasible solution to the 
council’s challenges,10 and as the “unsexy cousin of the mainstream reform 
debate”.11 What it habitually refers to are modes of increased corporation 
between the council and NGO’s and/or experts, and to matters relating to 
the council’s provisional rules of procedures.12 The question of the veto can 
complicate the structure/working methods compartmentalisation, because 
veto-reform is a structural issue. Re-delegation or removal of veto rights 
require charter amendment, but in principle the council could agree to codes 
of conduct concerning the veto, e.g., not to use it in the case of resolutions 
targeting genocide, without a charter amendment,13 which would be working 
methods reform.
2 Modes of Discussion
The research about UNSC reform mostly relies on one of two overall ratio-
nales. Both encompass the primary foci of the debate, namely how to advance 
the council’s legitimacy,14 effectiveness, and efficiency through reform. One 
perspective proposes that for the council to become a more legitimate organ 
9    Karen A Mingst, Margaret P Karns, and Alynna J Lyon, The United Nations in the 21st 
Century, 5th ed., Dilemmas in World Politics (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 2017), 58; 
Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Fourth edi 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 673.
10   Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council Membership, 210.
11   Peter Nadin, UN Security Council Reform, UN Security Council Reform (Abingdon, Oxon: 
Rou, 2016), 95, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687254.
12   See Sam Daws and Sidney Bailey, The Procedure of the UN Security Council / Sydney D. Bailey 
and Sam Daws, ed. Sydney Dawson Bailey and Sam Daws, Elektronis (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1998).The rules are guidelines for UNSC meetings, agendas, languages, voting, etc. and they 
are the basis for UNSC conduct despite never being formally adopted (Nadin, 2016, p. 95).
13   As proposed by France and Mexico in 2015.
14   Hurd (2008) notes that very little attention has been given to how legitimacy works or 
what it means in the studies of international relations.
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of global governance, a structural reform of its membership and/or its veto 
system is needed. Consequently, it is argued that structural reform will lead to 
improved effectiveness and efficiency, because the larger group of countries 
in the council will be able to calibrate regional and global perspectives with 
states’ agendas in an enhanced and more representative way, and therefore 
come up with better-fitted resolutions.
The opposing rationale is that a structural reform which expands the coun-
cil’s membership entails the risk of degrading the council’s effectiveness and 
efficiency. Therefore, proponents of working methods reform argue that more 
countries on the council means a higher number of unaccountable actors, and 
consequently, gridlocked negotiations. Accordingly, it is argued that reform 
should chiefly be about changes in how the council operates. The working 
methods proponents maintain that once the methods of the council have been 
improved, the council’s effectiveness and efficiency will increase as a result.15 
In the final analysis, the debate is about how opposing arguments are rooted in 
one of the two rationales.
Those who have the relevant diplomatic experience or have had the time 
to read up on the body of literature, know that UNSC reform itself is compli-
cated and necessitates many considerations, as laid out by Sievers & Daws 
in their ‘concluding reflections’.16 To include many of such nuances within a 
frame that provides an overview, I present the debate since 1993,17 by dividing 
it into four types of advocacy for UNSC reform that each reflect a different level 
of attachment to either structural or working methods reform. What one also 
learns from following both the debate among countries and scholars, is that 
arguments for views on reform must be explained vis-à-vis UNSC-legitimacy, 
effectiveness, and efficiency, as well as the understanding of a Global North / a 
Global South divide.18
15   Structural reform targets the council’s composition such as new permanent or non-
permanent members, whereas working methods looks for a change in procedural matters 
like increased transparency, coordination with the general assembly (GA), or change con-
cerning voting and speaking procedures.
16   Sievers and Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council.
17   In 1993 the Open Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on 
and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the 
Security Council was established.
18   The Global North connotes the relatively wealthy and industrialised metaphorical ‘Global 
North’, and that countries from this group have been favoured by globalisation Charles 
Jones, “Global North,” in A Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations 
(Oxford University Press, 2018). The Global South connotes the emergence since the 
1960’s of a new and relevant part of the globe, disassociated from the then predominant 
East-West thinking. When speaking of The Global South, it often, and particularly in the 
context of UNSC reform, refers to poor countries acting together Charles Jones, “Global 
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Focusing on major themes from a debate about an issue as intricate as the 
one in question, might be equivalent to an archaeologist applying an excavator 
to extract relics from a necropolis.19 However, allowing for a certain amount 
of generalisation for the sake of creating an overview provides the opportu-
nity to compartmentalise the literature. As a result, it becomes apparent that 
specific issues possess the apex of the debate and that it is possible to treat the 
existing input from a variety of academic fields, e.g., International Relations, 
International Organizations, International Law, International Politics, as part 
of the same discussion. Following the analogy of archaeology, the insensitive 
archaeologist who digs up and presents clusters might at first miss out on the 
details of a weapon, jewellery and pottery that would otherwise be excavated 
individually and sensibly. Nonetheless, digging up these artefacts in a clus-
ter will likely result in an immediate accumulation of artefacts, alongside a 
broader understanding of the positioning of graves in burying rituals, rather 
than detailed knowledge on ancient craftsmanship that could be uncovered 
by a sensible archaeologist who would use a trowel and brush to pick up one 
item after the other. In short, the following overview as analogously described 
above, presents four general types of reform advocacy as follows—tenacious 
and moderate advocacy for structural reform, and a tenacious and a moderate 
advocacy for working methods reform.
The mentioned typology of four advocacies is applied to the contemporary 
debate, meaning from 1993 onwards. The historical backdrop section starts 
from the UN’s inception. Both sections display that the discussion has 
moved from reflecting a Cold War and ensuing East-West context, on to mainly 
reflecting a framework of postcolonial issues, e.g., a North-South angle.20 
Concerning the proposed solutions, structural reform was more often sug-
gested in the earlier literature, but preferences for a working methods focus 
has continuously been on the rise.
3 Historiographic Overview
3.1 The Early Period (1945 until Reform in 1965)
It was Wilcox & Macy,21 who first framed the discussion as being about the 
question of structure or working methods. Thematically, this period saw a lot 
South,” in A Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations (Oxford 
University Press, 2018).
19   Term for an archaeological site with more than one grave at that particular site.
20   K.P. Saksena, Reforming the United Nations (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1993), 33.
21   Francis O Wilcox and Carl Milton Macy, Proposals for Changes in the United Nations, The 
Brookings Series on the United Nations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1955).
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of criticism of the veto system’s lack of fairness, and of its incompatibility with 
UN ideals of democracy.22 Such critiques were part of arguments for both 
structural reform via suggested abolition of the veto,23 and of arguments for 
enlargement of the council to enhance geographical equity.24 Goodrich25 how-
ever, who problematised the veto system, suggested a working methods reform 
via increased informal cooperation among the veto powers. The notions of 
geographical equity and adequate representation were utilised to argue for 
structural reform. Two concepts that also feature heavily when the same argu-
ment is made today.
Padelfort26 and Fish Armstrong27 both argued that an enlargement of the 
council, and thereby increased equity/geographical representation, was nec-
essary for the UNSC to sidestep the Cold War’s detrimental impact on the 
council’s ability to work. Hula28 on the other hand, did not think that any 
reform effort would let the UNSC sidestep the East-West antagonism because 
he saw the council as the Cold War’s “main battleground”.
The pressure on the council’s diplomatic milieu, that which emerged from 
Cold War antagonisms, prompted scholars to remain pessimistic concerning 
the UN’s future role and the prospect of reform.29 Hevesy30 however, saw the 
UN as “the champion of organisational opposition to colonial rule”, and thereby 
implied, that the UN as a whole would eventually be able to mend geopoliti-
cal conflicts and inequality—also with regards to UNSC reform. Generally, the 
period was shaped by a tendency to emphasise the need for structural reform. 
22   Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental 
Problems, with Supplement (London: Stevens & Sons, 1951); Leland Goodrich, “The UN 
Security Council: Inception, Record, and Causes of Its Decline,” ed. Leland Goodrich, 
International Organization 12 (1958): 273–87; P Hevesy, “The Reform of the United Nations 
and the Transformation of the British Empire,” ed. P Hevesy, Friedenswarte 54, no. 2 (1957): 
139–45; Wilcox and Macy, Proposals for Changes in the United Nations; Hamilton Fish 
Armstrong, “U.N. on Trial,” ed. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Foreign Affairs 39, no. 3 (1961): 
388, https://doi.org/10.2307/20029496.
23   Hevesy, “The Reform of the United Nations and the Transformation of the British Empire.”
24   Wilcox and Macy, Proposals for Changes in the United Nations; Fish Armstrong, 
“U.N. on Trial.”
25   Goodrich, “The UN Security Council: Inception, Record, and Causes of Its Decline.”
26   Norman J Padelford, “Politics and Change in the Security Council,” International 
Organization 14, no. 3 (1960): 381–401.
27   Fish Armstrong, “U.N. on Trial.”
28   Eric Hula, “The United Nations in Crisis,” Social Research 27, no. 4 (1960): 387–420.
29   Arthur N Holcombe, Strengthening the United Nations, 1st ed. (Westport, Connecticut, 
1957), 195.
30   Hevesy, “The Reform of the United Nations and the Transformation of the British Empire.”
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Still, Nicholas questioned the presumed connection between more members 
and increased efficiency.31
3.2 Post-reform 1965 until Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) 1993
The period following the 1965-reform included evaluations and explanations 
of that reform, but also calls for further reform. The reform in 1965 was an 
expansion of the council, i.e., a structural reform, from five permanent and 
six non-permanent members32 to, still five permanent members, but now ten 
non-permanent members. Bennet,33 viewed the UNSC-deadlock affected by 
the Cold War as a positive, arguing that it increased the responsibility assumed 
by the UN’s General Assembly, a notion he relied on to promote working 
methods reform. Furthermore, Bennett’s and Lall’s input about the Cold 
War34 joined the less pessimistic understanding of the Cold War’s impact on 
the council, a trend which appears to have resulted in fewer calls for struc-
tural reform.
Additionally, in this period the wording from the UN charter’s article 23 
that the UN should pay heed to equitable geographical representation devel-
oped into an essential phrase oft utilised to promote structural reform of the 
council. Teja35 pushed for structural reform to enhance geographical equity 
and viewed the recent reform as a result of smaller nations succeeding in 
accomplishing their agenda, whereby they had demonstrated their untapped 
potential as agents of change and progress. Consequently, he called for fur-
ther increase in effective, equitable representation (structural reform) to 
face the major powers’ reaction to the recent reform, which he argued, was 
to hold more informal meetings to disarm the influence of the increased 
membership. For Boyd, smaller nations remained insignificant, except in 
decreasing the council’s authority.36 Critics of the 1965-reform, however, were 
not unified in opposing increased representation. Lall37 criticised the reform’s 
31   H.G. Nicholas, “The United Nations in Crisis,” International Affairs 41, no. 3 (1965): 
441–50.
32   I use the terms non-permanent and electable interchangeably throughout the article.
33   A Leroy Bennett, “The Rejuvenation of the Security Council—Evidence and Reality,” 
Midwest Journal of Political Science 9, no. 4 (1965): 361–75.
34   Bennett; Arthur S Lall, The Security Council in a Universal United Nations, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. Occasional Paper, 11 (New York, 1971).
35   Jaskaran S Teja, “Expansion of the Security Council and Its Consensus Procedure,” 
Nederlands Tijschrift Voor International Recht 16 (1969): 349–63.
36   Andrew Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg: A History of the UN Security Council (London: 
Methuen & CO Ltd, 1971), 112.
37   Lall, The Security Council in a Universal United Nations.
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mode of expansion and called for further regionalisation38 of the permanent 
seats to temper the USA-Soviet dominance of global politics. Hiscocks saw 
both the risk and reward caused by the recent structural reform,39 which was 
also the position of Baehr & Gordenker40 who argued that expansion of seats 
increased the equity on the council but lowered its effectiveness.
A primary feature present in the period from 1965 until 1993 is the emerging 
problematisations of the council as being insufficiently representative of the 
world, and that increased membership might be detrimental to the council’s 
ability to operate effectively.
3.3 The Debate since the Initiation of the Open-ended Working Group 
(OEWG) in 1993
Within the UN, the progress of reform was manifested with the establish-
ment of the ‘Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable 
Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council’ 
(OEWG) in 1993.41 The working group still exists, affirming its unappealing 
nickname ‘the never-ending working group’.42 In 2008, the formal negotiations 
about UNSC reform transferred to the annually recurring rounds of informal 
talks43 in the ‘Intergovernmental Negotiations’ (IGN).44 Before this transition, 
in 2003, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had assembled a panel to report on 
threats, challenges, and change [to international security and peace] (HLP),45 a 
report that included recommendations for a reform of the SC. Corresponding 
with, or perhaps inspired by the outlined development within the UN, more 
input from academia began emerging in the early 1990’s.
The following typology outlines scholars’ positions since 1993.
38   Regionalisation mainly refers to the provision of permanent council seats to countries 
that are understood as highly influential in their respective regions. Regionalization can 
also refer to increased attention to equal regional division of both types of seats.
39   Richard Hiscocks, The Security Council (Plymouth: Clark, Doble & Brendon Ltd, 1973).
40   Peter R. Baehr and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations—Reality and Ideal (New York, NY: 
Praeger Publisher, 1984).
41   Paul Taylor, Sam Daws, and Ute Adamczick, Documents on Reform of the United Nations / 
Edited by Paul Taylor, Sam Daws, Ute Adamczick, ed. Paul Taylor (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
1997), 416.
42   Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 1., 
vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 661, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/ 
9780199560103.001.0001.
43   If the GA decides for the negotiations to continue which has been the case since the IGN’s 
initiation.
44   Lydia Swart, “Timeline of UN Security Council Reform,” 2015.
45   Gro Harlem, Sadako Ogata, and Salim Salim, “Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change” 60231, no. December (2004).
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4 Four Types of UNSC-reform Advocacy
4.1 Tenacious Advocacy for Structural Reform
Structural reform is of the utmost importance and should be the foremost 
preference for securing and enhancing the council’s validity. One of the most 
critical arguments concerns the allocation of seats to countries from the Global 
South. Also, it is contended that this course of action will amend a current sen-
sation among many countries that the UNSC is an agent of the World War II 
victors and their national agendas.46
According to Langmore and Thakur,47 an unchanged and unchangeable 
membership of the council undermines its status and diminishes its authority 
and legitimacy. They propose that the elected members of the council should 
46   Kishore Mahbubani, The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World 
(New York, NY: Public affairs, 2014); Madeleine O. Hosli and Thomas Dörfler, “The United 
Nations Security Council the Challenge of Reform,” in Rising Powers and Multilateral 
Institutions, ed. D. Lesage and Van de Graaf T. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 135–52, 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137397607_8; Madeleine O. Hosli and Thomas 
Dörfler, “Why Is Change so Slow? Assessing Prospects for United Nations Security Council 
Reform,” Journal of Economic Policy Reform 7870, no. September (2017): 1–16, https://doi 
.org/10.1080/17487870.2017.1305903; John Langmore and Ramesh Thakur, “The Elected 
but Neglected Security Council Members,” Washington Quarterly 39, no. 2 (2016): 99–114, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1204412; Joseph E. Schwartzberg, “Towards a More 
Representative and Effective Security Council,” Political Geography 13, no. 6 (1994): 
483–91, https://doi.org/10.1016/0962-6298(94)90037-X; Kishore Mahbubani, “Permanent 
and Elected Council Members,” in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 
21st Century, ed. David Malone and M. David Boulder (London: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 
253–66; Joseph E. Schwartzberg, “Entitlement Quotients as a Vehicle for United Nations 
Reform,” Global Governance 9, no. 1 (2003): 81–114; Robert C. Johansen, “Enhancing the 
United Nations Peace-Keeping,” in The Future of the United Nations System: Potential for 
the Twenty-First Century, ed. Chadwick F. Alger (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 
1998), 450; Peter Wallensteen, “Representing the World: A Security Council for the 21st 
Century,” ed. Peter Wallensteen, Security Dialogue 25, no. 1 (1994): 63–75, https://doi.org/10
.1177/0967010694025001006; Madeleine O. Hosli et al., “Squaring the Circle? Collective and 
Distributive Effects of United Nations Security Council Reform,” Review of International 
Organizations 6, no. 2 (2011): 163–87, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-011-9101-1; Vesselin 
Popovski, “Win-Win Formula for Reforming the UN Security Council,” in The Global 
Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2015, ed. Giuliana Ziccardi 
Capaldo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Mark A Boyer, Jonathan R Strand, and 
David P Rapkin, “Weighted Voting in the United Nations Security Council,” ed. Mark A 
Boyer, Jonathan R Strand, and David P Rapkin, Simulation & Gaming 42, no. 6 (2011): 
772–802, https://doi.org/10.1177/1046878110365514; Richard Butler, “Reform of the United 
Nations Security Council,” Penn State Journal of Law & International Studies 1, no. 1 (2012): 
23–39.
47   Langmore and Thakur, “The Elected but Neglected Security Council Members.”
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be eighteen instead of the current ten seats and should remain in the council 
for three years instead of the current two. Mahbubani presents the question 
about achieving a structural reform as being one between the council keep-
ing its current composition, and as a result losing its credibility, or, changing 
its structure and gaining credibility.48 Mahbubani’s tenacity in pointing to the 
severe need for a structural reform that includes expansion of the permanent 
membership is underscored by his warning that “the continuing efforts of the 
P5 to retain their absolute dictatorial power amounts to folly”.49 (2014, p. 116). 
This folly, Mahbubani argues, can eventually lead to a political storm that 
will sweep out the system of permanent SC members (p. 239). Consequently, 
Mahbubani proposes a new council that consists of seven permanent mem-
bers, seven semi-permanent members (selected from a group of the same 
twenty-eight countries every other year), and seven electable members from 
the rest of the UN membership (p. 244). Popovski (2016) makes a similar sug-
gestion with eight seats in the same three categories.
Also, within the category of tenacious structural reform advocacy are anal-
yses of the current voting system and proposals for change therein. Boyer 
et al. (2011) and Dervis (2005) represent the track of thought which focuses 
on improving the council’s operability via (a structural) reform of the voting 
system. Nonetheless, the rationale of Boyer et al., and Dervis’ arguments quali-
fies as structural reform advocacy because abolishment of the current veto 
system, and formal changes to how voting is conducted in the council, require 
charter amendments. Their calls are tenacious because they emphasise that 
the council currently promotes unfair power relations. Moreover, structural 
reform is the only way that this immoral arrangement can be amended or 
toned down.
What binds the positions of this category together is an emphasis on the 
utmost need for change in the structure of the council. Also essential within 
this thinking, is the notion that working methods reform, if undertaken without 
structural reform, carries with it a severe defect. This is caused by not counter-
balancing what is seen as an unfair and therefore untenable current structure 
of the SC, one that needs a more balanced geographical representation.50
48   Mahbubani, The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World; 
Kishore Mahbubani, “Council Reform and the Emerging Powers,” in The UN Security 
Council in the 21st Century, ed. Sebastian Von Einsedel, David M Malone, and Bruno 
Stagno Ugarte (London: Lynne Rienner, 2016), 157–74.
49   Mahbubani, The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World.
50   Hosli and Dörfler, “Why Is Change so Slow? Assessing Prospects for United Nations 
Security Council Reform,” 13; Wallensteen, “Representing the World: A Security Council 
for the 21st Century,” 64; Butler, “Reform of the United Nations Security Council.”
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The tenacious advocacy for structural reform also contains variations 
in evaluations of the feasibility of structural reform. In their final analy-
ses, proponents for this mode of reform envision serious opposition from 
certain countries, yet structural reform is still viewed as ultimately being 
achievable. Hosli (2011), presents structural reform as an arduous challenge, 
whereas Poposvski (2016) and Mahbubani (2014) present structural reform as 
inevitable. Popovski argues that reform will occur, because it will be of ben-
efit to all UN member states, and Mahbubani argues that structural reform 
is the inescapable choice if the countries sitting at or near the top of the cur-
rent global power structure wish to remain relevant actors in the structure 
of global governance. Langmore and Thakur (2016) are also optimists, perhaps 
because they leave veto-reform out of their proposal. Whether veto-reform 
is viewed as harder to achieve than an expanded membership is hard to say. 
Johansen (1998), Wallensteen (1994), Swartzberg (1994), Boyer et al. (2011), 
and Dervis (2005) all support the abolishment of the veto system in the name 
of democracy. Out of these, only Swartzberg engages in a thorough defence of 
his proposal’s chances of success. He argues, that pressure on the current veto 
holders to give up their prerogative, will increase and succeed as a result of 
other less challenging reforms within the UN system. All in all, the arguments 
that tenaciously call for structural reform are connected by a sense of urgency 
and exclusive priority, but the tenacious position contains variations when it 
comes to perceptions of chances of success and prioritisation of reforming the 
veto system.
4.2 Moderate Advocacy for Structural Reform
Another type of advocacy for structural reform subsists. This type gener-
ally agrees with the tenacious type that the Global South should be better 
represented on the council. What makes this a moderate position in favour 
of structural reform is the inclination to refrain from adopting a “structure 
before all” thinking as found in the tenacious arguments. Moderate structural 
reform advocacy broadly recognises that achieving structural reform will be 
very difficult and appreciates the potential rewards found in working methods 
approaches. Yet, the rationales of this category can still best be treated as in 
favour of a structural reform, albeit moderate, because, ultimately, structural 
reform, it is argued, should be prioritised over working methods reform.51
51   Bourantonis, “The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform”; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, “Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform,” 
American Journal of International Law 99, no. 3 (2005): 619–31; Bruce Russett, Barry 
O’Neill, and James Sutterlin, “Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam,” Global 
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Fassbender’s point about the futility of any reform not written into the 
charter52 is an appropriate introductory point for moderate structural reform 
arguments. Fassbender’s position reflects a consciousness concerning both the 
challenging aspect of changing the UNSC membership and the benefits that 
changes in the working methods might bring about. He maintains that reform 
must be implemented in the charter to avoid being revoked according to pow-
erful states’ preferences. Knight argues that reform should target increased 
council transparency and democracy (both of which can be achieved without 
changing the structure of the council). In his final analysis, he puts forth that 
veto change or addition of permanent members might affect the council’s abil-
ity to operate, and therefore, only the addition of non-permanent members 
should occur. This being “A more modest strategy” in his own words.53 Knight 
is focused on making the council less elitist and more representative, a notion 
which is backed by Bourantonnis.54 He concludes his exposition of the histori-
cal process of UNSC reform negotiations by suggesting that if the council fails 
to update in accordance with contemporary geopolitical realities, alienation 
and crises between the council and the UN membership will ensue.
Russett et al., propose that inadequate representation on the council must 
be thought of, not only vis-à-vis the Global South, but also with regards to the 
countries that are most capable and willing to contribute economically to 
the UN, i.e., Japan and Germany.55 Russet et al.’s suggestion for structural 
reform is moderate because they consider added permanency and veto rights 
as not only non-attainable but also as and non-preferable. A stance which 
leads them to suggesting expansion of the non-permanent seats from ten to 
sixteen, combined with the introduction of re-election for those seats.
Governance 2, no. 1 (1996): 65–80; Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the 
Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective, Legal Aspects of International Organization, 
32 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998); W Andy Knight, “The Future of the 
UN Security Council: Questions of Legitimacy and Representation in Multilateral 
Governance,” in Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy?, 2001, 19–37; 
Justin Morris, “UN Security Council Reform: A Counsel for the 21st Century,” Security 
Dialogue, 2000, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010600031003002.
52   Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective, 
346.
53   Knight, “The Future of the UN Security Council: Questions of Legitimacy and Repre-
sentation in Multilateral Governance,” 34.
54   Bourantonis, “The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform.”
55   Both of which have been favorites for obtaining increased representation on the coun-
cil for some years (albeit their time as favorites have come to pass according to Swart & 
Freiesleben (2013, p. 21) Japan and Germany contributes the second and third most to the 
UN budget respectively).
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Calls for changes to the veto system is not central to moderate structural 
reform advocacy. Slaughter,56 for example, suggests that an expansion of the 
non-permanent seats is a way for the global community of states to face down 
the usage of the veto from permanent members. She argues that this kind of 
expanded membership enables influence that corresponds to a global public 
opinion via the increase in represented states. Blum agrees, and contends that 
it will be harder for veto powers to halt resolutions that come forth with broad 
support.57 Fassbender58 however, believes that the veto system must be directly 
and not informally reformed. From a legal standpoint, he challenges proposals 
for a reform of the veto that is based on informal agreements between the P5 
about abstaining from using their veto on specific resolutions. This approach, 
Fassbender argues, is grounded in an incorrect reading of the charter’s stipula-
tions about voting procedures in the Security Council (Article 27. Par. 3) which 
states that an affirmative vote is needed from nine members, including the 
concurring votes of the P5. Consequently, Fassbender believes that the charter 
and its call for the council to maintain international peace can be the starting 
point of veto reforms. He believes that structural, i.e. charter based reform of 
the veto usage from P5 states involved in the issue targeted by the resolution 
at hand, should be pursued as way to maintain peace and prevent conflict and 
thereby uphold the charter.
Morris59 also focuses on how structural reform should be about impactful 
representation over moral representation. His position signifies the backbone 
of the moderate call for structural reform, namely, that structural reform is a 
moral responsibility for the UN and the global society to achieve, but also, that 
decision-makers should be aware that certain kinds of structural reform might 
result in unwanted consequences.
The moderate type of advocacy for structural reform is characterised by 
how proponents acknowledge the same issues as the tenacious type, i.e., the 
need for broader representation of countries and regions on the council. It is 
a different position being that the value of working methods reform is gen-
erally recognized. Additionally, caution about potential caveats of certain 
approaches to structural reform exists.
56   Slaughter, “Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform.”
57   Blum, “Proposals for UN Security Council Reform.”
58   Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective.
59   Justin Morris, “UN Security Council Reform A Council for the 21st Century,” Security 
Dialogue 31, no. 3 (2000): 265–77.
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4.3 Tenacious Advocacy for Working Methods Reform
The underlying thinking of scholars’ calls for working methods reflects that 
structural reform might satisfy many countries’ desire for a council with 
increased global representation. Nevertheless, it is argued, such an approach 
will most likely be detrimental to the council’s ability to operate and deliver 
results. The tenacious version of working methods advocacy emphasises the 
potential detriments of structural reform, and almost exclusively acknowl-
edges working methods as the sound path toward worthwhile reform.60
When criticising arguments for structural reform, working methods reform 
advocates mainly focus on the disadvantages of UNSC expansion. The veto sys-
tem plays a smaller role, yet still factors in as part of what working methods 
proponents want to change. Caron,61 Cox,62 and Nadin,63 argue for a reform of 
the veto arrangement through a working methods approach, i.e., without char-
ter amendments. Cox and Nadin both propose that the veto should be changed 
via informal agreements between the veto powers about the restriction of 
veto usage. Additionally, Caron believes, that the charter, as it stands, contains 
untapped potential to prevent an existing practice he calls ‘the reverse veto’, 
60   Nadin, UN Security Council Reform; Seryon Lee, “The Feasibility of Reforming the Un 
Security Council: Too Much Talk, Too Little Action?,” Journal of East Asia and International 
Law 4, no. 2 (2011): 405–18; Brian Cox, “United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected 
Proposals and Possible Consequences,” South Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Business 6, no. 1 (2009): 1–36, http://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb%5Cnhttp://scholar 
commons.sc.edu/scjilb/vol6/iss1/4%5Cnhttp://www.cnn.com/2009/BUSINESS/01/28 
/davos.wef.annan/index.html%5Cnhttp://www.un.org/largerfreedomi/chap5.htm.; 
Schaefer, “Reforming the United Nations Security Council: Feasibility or Utopia?”; Ryan 
Davis, “An Unrealistic Proposal: An Argument Agaist The Enlargement of the United 
Nations Security Council,” International Affairs Review 19, no. 1 (2010): 19–41, http://
www.iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/An Unrealistic Proposal.pdf; Hassler, 
Reforming the UN Security Council Membership; Colin (FES New York) Keating, “Reforming 
the Working Methods of the UN Security Council: The Next ACT” (New York, NY, 2011); 
Lauri Mälksoo, “Great Powers Then and Now: Security Council Reform and Responses to 
Threats to Peace and Security,” in United Nations Reforn and the New Collective Security, 
ed. Peter G Danchin and Horst Fischer (Cambridge: Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 94–113; Christian Wenaveser, “Working Methods: The Ugly Duckling of 
Security Council Reform,” in The UN Security Council in the 21st Century, ed. Sebastion Von 
Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Brunie Stagno Ugarte (London: Lynne Rienner, 2016), 
175–94.
61   David D. Caron, “The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council 
Author,” American Journal of International Law 87, no. 4 (1993): 552–88.
62   Cox, “United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and Possible 
Consequences.”
63   Nadin, UN Security Council Reform.
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which is when the veto is used to avoid alteration or ending of ongoing UNSC 
backed missions.64 Davis65 also views the veto system as problematic and fun-
damentally unfair. But whereas Caron, Cox, and Nadin want informal changes 
to the veto system, Davis argues, that instead of focusing on membership or 
the veto, more attention should be paid to increasing transparency concerning 
interactions and connections within the council, and to reducing the number 
of resolutions that initiates military interventions. Such approaches to reform, 
Davis argues, will increase the council’s credibility.
The tenacious advocacy for working methods reform often contains propos-
als that are more generic than they are precise, e.g., calls for better corporation 
with NGO’s, or the mentioned calls for informal agreements that limit the 
use of the veto. There is more precision in the critical claims about structural 
reform, particularly that expansion of electable seats, permanent seats, and 
veto rights will hamper the council’s ability to function. Both Caron’s, Cox’s, 
Davis’, and Nadin’s dispositions towards reform via enlargement is comprised 
in Cox’s claim that: “As such, equitable geographical representation should not 
be sought in reforming the Council. Permanent regional seats, whether held by 
organizations or states for no reason other than geographical equity, skew the 
purpose of the council away from preventing a world war.”66
The aversion against structural reform is the pillar that sustains the tenacious 
calls for working methods reform, and it is often supported by the argument 
that working methods is the obtainable reform approach.67 Hassler and Nadin 
also both see structural reform as an answer, not to what the global community 
needs, but to states’ national interest. They agree that, unfortunately, reform 
via structural expansion has become an ingrained discourse within the diplo-
matic sphere of multinational negotiations on the matter.68
Hassler adds to the critique of structural reform thinking by pointing out 
the unpredictability of geopolitics. She argues that an expanded USNC that sat-
isfies much of the membership via the presence of recently emerged regional 
powers might in the future face the same calls for reform, due to fluctuations 
64   Caron, “The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council Author,” 556.
65   Davis, “An Unrealistic Proposal: An Argument Agaist The Enlargement of the United 
Nations Security Council.”
66   Cox, “United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and Possible 
Consequences,” 22.
67   Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council Membership, 84; Nadin, UN Security Council 
Reform, 113.
68   Nadin, UN Security Council Reform, 117; Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council 
Membership, 234.
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of global power and influence.69 The tenacious advocacy for working methods 
reform is essentially a warning voice against what is seen as the false hope 
associated with a structural reform approach,70 and moreover, as a cluster of 
arguments for why working methods reform is realistic.71 Structural reform, it 
is argued, offers only a false hope because it is unlikely to happen, and because 
a council with more will heighten the current council’s problems.
4.4 Moderate Advocacy for Working Methods Reform
The moderate position echoes the tenacious working methods arguments 
when it comes to emphasising working methods reform. Yet two overall 
types of arguments dominate the moderate calls for working methods reform, 
both of which distinguishes this advocacy from the tenacious working meth-
ods advocacy. First, the rhetoric utilised to describe the consequences of 
structural reform is less critical than that which is found in the tenacious argu-
ments for working methods reform. Second, within the cluster of moderate 
arguments, proposals for reforms often include both structural and working 
methods aspects, but not as an unwanted necessity, as seen in the tenacious 
arguments. Moderate working methods reformists generally appreciate that 
structural changes could benefit the council, yet, moderate calls for working 
methods contains scepticism towards unproven predictions about the positive 
consequences of structural reform.72
Weiss73 notes that structural reform will only temporarily appease the calls 
for greater inclusion in the council and that it, therefore, is not a sustainable 
path to reform. Weiss also agrees with the foundational point of tenacious 
working methods advocates, namely that enlargement would likely damage the 
69   Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council Membership, 132.
70   Davis, “An Unrealistic Proposal: An Argument Agaist The Enlargement of the United 
Nations Security Council,” 37.
71   Nadin, UN Security Council Reform; Keating, “Reforming the Working Methods of the UN 
Security Council: The Next ACT.”
72   Ian Hurd, “Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform,” 
Global Governance 14, no. 2 (2008): 199–217; Edward C. Luck, Un Security Council -Practice 
and Promise-, Routledge, vol. 1, 2006, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004; 
Thomas G. Weiss, “The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform,” The Washington Quarterly 
26, no. 4 (2003): 147–61, https://doi.org/10.1162/016366003322387163; Thomas G. Weiss 
and Karen E. Young, “Compromise and Credibility: Security Council Reform?,” Security 
Dialogue 36, no. 2 (2005): 131–54, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010605054632; Thomas G 
Weiss, “A Pipe Dream? Reforming the United Nations,” ed. Thomas G Weiss, Harvard 
International Review 33, no. 1 (2011): 48.
73   Weiss, “The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform.”
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councils’ functionality.74 Also, Luck echoes one of the tenacious camp’s central 
points, stating that it will be very difficult to accommodate everyone when it 
comes to wishes for a changed UNSC structure.75 Further, Luck argues that 
if the current council, with its present working methods, are not sufficiently 
maintaining global peace, it cannot be expected that an enlarged council can 
do so.76 Weiss sees charter reform (i.e., structural reform) as a distraction from 
the more important discussions about the council, calling for evolutionary 
change and not revolutionary change,77 and restraint before urgency.78
Luck signifies the central stance of the moderate advocacy for working 
methods reform more than Weiss. He sees the disagreements among states 
concerning structural reform as having documented that the council’s work-
ing methods must be reformed first, perhaps leading to later structural reforms 
e.g. more elected members.79 Luck portrays structural reform as potentially 
beneficial but situated below working methods reform on a list of priorities. 
In recognising the value of eventual structural reform, Luck’s understanding 
and subsequent calls for structural reform aspects do not belong in the same 
category (tenacious working methods advocacy) as those proposed out of 
necessity by Nadin and Hassler,80 as they share a more pessimistic understand-
ing of the consequences from a structural reform.
Other moderate proposals for working methods reform come from Niemetz,81 
who proposes that a reform should make the inclusion of civil society possible 
in the council’s voting procedures, and from Hurd82 who applies a discourse 
analytical approach to challenge the logic found in calls for structural reform. 
Niemetz’s and Hurd’s main agendas include harsh criticism of calls for struc-
tural reform, but their theses are mostly trying to re-shape the discussion by 
74   Weiss and Young, “Compromise and Credibility: Security Council Reform?,” 2005.
75   Luck, “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress.”
76   Luck, UN Security Council -Practice and Promise.
77   Weiss, “The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform.”
78   Thomas G Weiss, Thinking about Global Governance: Why People and Ideas Matter, 
ed. Thomas G Weiss (London: Routledge, 2011).
79   Edward C. Luck, “Reforming the Security Council—Step One: Improving Working 
Methods,” 2005; Edward C. Luck, “The Security Council at Seventy: Ever Changing or Never 
Changing?,” in The UN Security Council in the 21st Century, ed. Lynne Riener Publishers 
(Boulder, Co, 2016), 195–216.
80   Nadin, UN Security Council Reform; Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council 
Membership.
81   Martin D. Niemetz, Reforming the UN Decision-Making Procedures: Promoting a 
Deliberative System for Global Peace and Security (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015).
82   Hurd, “Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council 
Reform.”
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introducing new dimensions to the debate, i.e., the inclusion of civil society 
and discourse analysis, not to chiefly oppose the value of structural reform. 
Blum’s article83 is one that, along with many of Weiss’s arguments, trends 
towards tenacious advocacy for working methods reform. She believes that a 
point exists, where the amount of new UNSC members would reach a critical 
mass and make the council too big to act. Besides, Blum rejects the notion 
that geographical representation should be an essential aspect of the reform 
process. Nonetheless, Blum realises that in the final analysis, a failed procedure 
of council enlargement will likely lead to failure in improved working methods 
as well. As a result, Blum is critical towards certain aspects of structural reform 
and warns of potential dangers attached to it but does not rule out that struc-
tural reform presents positive aspects.
Wouters and Ruys, subscribe to another string of argumentation. They call 
for emphases on accountability and democratic build-up in the council, and 
argue, that representation-focus [inclusion of more members] will not ensure 
that new members live up to the demands that come with being a council 
member or provide a better functioning council.84
Ultimately, the moderate advocacy for working methods reform ranges from 
Blum’s and Weiss’ criticism of structural reform, toward Hurds scepticism of 
the logic of arguments for structural reform, and to Blum and Luck’s apprecia-
tion of the need for structural reform, in combination with working methods 
reform. All proponents of these types of reform calls are united in the priori-
tisation of working methods over the council’s structure, and their scepticism 
towards the proposed benefits of structural reform.
4.5 Summary
Not all contributions point to a particular mode of reform. Schaefer85 and 
Mälksoo,86 for example, have written mainly to portray the challenges and, in 
their eyes, the bleak outlook for meaningful reform of the council. The central 
points from the four types of advocacy however, are present in most if not all 
literature concerned with UNSC reform. That is, whether or not the structure 
of the UNSC aligns, or should align, with principals of equity and with the geo-
political realities of today.
83   Blum, “Proposals for UN Security Council Reform.”
84   Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys, “Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a New Century?,” 
Military Law and Law of War Review, 2005, 164–66, https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2007.54.1.23.
85   Schaefer, “Reforming the United Nations Security Council: Feasibility or Utopia?”
86   Mälksoo, “Great Powers Then and Now: Security Council Reform and Responses to 
Threats to Peace and Security.”
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The answers found in both types of arguments for structural reform are 
constructed as normative propositions,87 arguing first and foremost, that prin-
cipals of democracy and equality should be the central guides for how the 
international community approaches UNSC reform. On the other side of 
the main dividing line, arguments in favour of working methods are based 
more on pragmatic considerations. Working methods proponents argue that 
the council was created to serve a function, and how that task is best fulfilled 
ought to be the primary guide for those discussing UNSC reform. In short, 
structural reform arguments are based on calls for the council’s alignment with 
contemporary geopolitical realities, whereas working methods reform argu-
ments are based on precautions against this.
Many authors will not appreciate the claim that their arguments are chiefly 
based on a distinctive normative or pragmatic approach. They will argue that 
their analyses and proposals encompass both aspects. How proponents for 
both kinds of UNSC reform include the normative and the pragmatic dimen-
sion, while still emphasising mainly one, is through how they present causality 
as going from one to the other, via the terms legitimacy, effectiveness, and effi-
ciency, which are concepts that in themselves represent essential aspects of 
the debate in question.
5 Legitimacy, Effectiveness, Efficiency
To be effective, international governance must be concentrated in some 
body other than the whole. The question is how to design this body so 
that the governed as a whole, both in fact and in perception, are served 
rather than oppressed.88
Caron’s statement showcases the core of what is discussed, when language 
about the legitimacy, effectiveness, and the efficiency of the council is utilised. 
Effectiveness refers to the ability to produce the expected outcome, and effi-
ciency refers to the same, but with an emphasis on doing it without wasted 
efforts or resources. These two terms are used interchangeably in the debate, 
but they always refer to the council’s ability to perform its task—the main-
tenance of peace [henceforth: effectiveness/efficiency = efficiency]. When 
it comes to legitimacy, what is often referred to, is what Caron coins as 
the perception of being served rather than oppressed. Discussions about the 
87   Zacher (2004) labels structural refom “the central normative issue” [of UN reform].
88   Caron, “The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council Author,” 588.
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legitimacy of the council can refer to how countries and other actors evaluate 
the actions of the council, but mainly, legitimacy concerning UNSC reform is 
discussed when assessing whether the council in its composition sufficiently 
represents the body of UN member states.
The structural reform camp believes there is a decline in the UNSC’s legiti-
macy, either as a consequence of unequal representation i.e., a structure that 
reflects 1945 and not today,89 or explained as a combination of unequal geo-
graphical representation and disappointing performance (inefficiency) from 
the council.90 One would perhaps expect that the majority of calls for working 
methods reform would point out that the status of the council’s legitimacy 
is mainly a result of its unsatisfactory performance, such as non-intervention 
in contemporary conflicts, e.g. Syria and Crimea, and leave out that unequal 
representation influences legitimacy in a negative direction. Such theses 
exist,91 but mostly, the arguments for a working methods reform tend to appre-
ciate that the council’s lack of global representativeness is significant when 
explaining the apparent decrease in the council’s legitimacy.92 Nonetheless, 
the majority of working methods proponents assert that an expanded mem-
bership, both permanent or non-permanent, in the long run, will impact the 
council’s legitimacy negatively, because it would damage the council’s ability 
to operate efficiently.93
As mentioned earlier, both sides argue that their suggested mode of reform 
increases the UNSC’s legitimacy and efficiency. The difference is found in how 
the causality between legitimacy and efficiency is portrayed. Structural reform 
89   Schwartzberg, “Entitlement Quotients as a Vehicle for United Nations Reform,” 81; 
Russett, O’Neill, and Sutterlin, “Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam,” 78; 
Mahbubani, The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World, 239; Hosli 
and Dörfler, “Why Is Change so Slow? Assessing Prospects for United Nations Security 
Council Reform,” 1–2.
90   Langmore and Thakur, “The Elected but Neglected Security Council Members,” 101–2; 
Matthew Gould and Matthew D. Rablen, “Reform of the United Nations Security Council: 
Equity and Efficiency,” Public Choice 173, no. 1–2 (2017): 3, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127 
-017-0468-2; Mahbubani, “Council Reform and the Emerging Powers,” 154.
91   Nadin, UN Security Council Reform; Davis, “An Unrealistic Proposal: An Argument Agaist 
The Enlargement of the United Nations Security Council.”
92   Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council Membership, 2. 80–84; Sebastian Von Einsiedel, 
David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, “Conclusion: The Security Council and a 
World in Crisis,” in The UN Security Council in the 21st Century, ed. Sebastian Von Einsiedel, 
David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 2015), 827.
93   Nadin, UN Security Council Reform, 87; Keating, “Reforming the Working Methods of the 
UN Security Council: The Next ACT,” 85–86; Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte, “Conclusion: 
The Security Council and a World in Crisis,” 20; Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council 
Membership, 116.
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advocacy contends that increased legitimacy leads to more efficiency,94 i.e., 
“[a security council] that better reflects the geopolitical realities of today, would 
be more authoritative, and therefore more efficient”.95 On the other hand, 
working methods advocacy see the inverse causality, namely that increased 
efficiency will lead to an increase in the council’s legitimacy.96 Moreover, 
many who support a working methods reform, will criticise claims about how 
legitimacy, achieved via structural reform, will lead to efficiency.97 Hurd for 
example, is mainly critical towards the notion of causality from legitimacy to 
efficiency.98 Mälksoo goes further, favouring neither of the two overall modes 
of reform, he labels the idea of proposing even a correlation between the two 
concepts as “absurdly idealistic”.99
However, the majority view, found on both sides of the working methods/
structure divide, is reflected by Russet et al., in the claim that: “Ultimately, legit-
imacy and effectiveness depend substantially on each other”.100 Related to the 
portrayal of how the legitimacy and efficiency of the council can be improved, 
there is also the discussion about whether and how an increased representa-
tion of The Global South can be manifested.
6 UNSC Reform and the Proposed Global North-Global South Divide101
The UNSC must be restructured, to include a prominent member of the 
Global South.102
94   Langmore and Thakur, “The Elected but Neglected Security Council Members”; 
Mahbubani, “Council Reform and the Emerging Powers.”
95   Louise Fréchette, “Adapting to the Twenty-First Century,” in Irrelevant or Indispensable?: 
The United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Paul Heinbecker and Patricia Goff 
(Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2005), 13.
96   Keating, “Reforming the Working Methods of the UN Security Council: The Next ACT”; 
Wenaveser, “Working Methods: The Ugly Duckling of Security Council Reform.”
97   Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council Membership; Wenaveser, “Working Methods: 
The Ugly Duckling of Security Council Reform”; Hurd, “Myths of Membership: The Politics 
of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform.”
98   Hurd, “Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform.”
99   Mälksoo, “Great Powers Then and Now: Security Council Reform and Responses to 
Threats to Peace and Security,” 110.
100   Russett, O’Neill, and Sutterlin, “Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam,” 66.
101   Zifcak’s work (2009) is a discussion of the North-South issues concerning UN reform in 
general.
102   Klaus Schlichtmann, “An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform,” Beijing Law 
Review 97 (2011): 106.
Downloaded from Brill.com04/15/2020 09:19:13AM
via free access
93A Review of the Academic Debate
The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 6 (2020) 71–101
Discussions about Global North-South relations, i.e., addressing the current 
imbalance,103 play essential roles in the reform-debate, often in combination 
with the legitimacy-efficiency aspect. Fassbender has explicated that states 
from the Global North generally prefer working methods reform, whereas 
countries from the Global South prefer structural reform.104 Zifcak reiterates 
this point in stating that “[…] the North’s principal interests relate to matters of 
security and efficiency. The South’s primary emphasis is on economic develop-
ment and equity”.105 Geopolitical North-South imbalance and the quandary 
of maintaining a stance which (in the eyes of the Global South) upholds his-
torical injustices, is countered by working methods proponents, by the already 
mentioned complaint about the debate being too idealistic. It is argued, that it 
has become politically incorrect to speak against structural reform, even if it is 
seen as detrimental to council efficiency.106
Luck, a moderate working methods proponent, maintains that the cost of a 
reform which decreases inequality among states concerning UNSC represen-
tation could be a decline in the council’s efficiency, as more countries would 
then have a say in matters where the current fewer countries cannot agree.107 
Not only do working methods advocates point out the threat to the council’s 
efficiency, as posed by enlargement, the case is also being made that expand-
ing the council only serves as temporary appeasement to the states calling for 
this kind of reform. All countries part of—or identifying with—The Global 
South cannot become members. Eventually, Nadin argues, an enlarged council 
will again be perceived as an elitist club by those on the outside,108 and the 
legitimacy of the council, with regards to the notion of representation of 
the Global South, will not have been increased.
103   Sam Daws, “Security Council Reform: The Dual Risks,” in Proceedings of the International 
Conference on UN Reform (Tehran, Iran, 2005), 1.
104   Bardo Fassbender, “Pressure for Security Council Refrom,” in The UN Security Council. 
From the Cold War to the 21st Century., ed. David M Malone (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc, 2004), 341–55.
105   Spencer Zifcak, United Nations Reform: Heading North or South? (Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge, 2009), 170.
106   Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council Membership, 3; Nico Schrijver, “Reforming the 
UN Security Council in Pursuance of Collective Security,” Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law 12, no. 1 (2007): 134, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krm003; Schaefer, “Reforming the 
United Nations Security Council: Feasibility or Utopia?,” 88.
107   Luck, “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress”; Edward C. Luck, 
“How Not to Reform the United Nations,” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism 
and … 11, no. 4 (2005): 407–14, http://journals.rienner.com/doi/abs/10.5555/ggov.2005.11.4 
.407; Luck, UN Security Council -Practice and Promise.
108   Nadin, UN Security Council Reform, 73–75.
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The response to notions of future changes in global power found in calls 
for structural reform is to suggest semi-permanent seats via potential repeat-
ing re-elections.109 Critique of this approach as a more attainable version of 
structural reform comes from structural reform proponent Schwartzberg. He 
notes that “semi-permanent” seats is a strategy based on an oxymoron, and 
not worth following.110 This view is also shared by tenacious working meth-
ods proponent Hassler, who points out that powerful nations would have an 
easier task set before them in gaining re-election, than smaller states’ task of 
being elected.111
Regardless of how scholars are positioned concerning what kind of reform 
they propose and the significance attributed to a global North/South division, 
most of them also present explanations of why substantial reform has yet 
to occur.
7 What Is the Hold-up?
Arguably, change happens even if reform does not,112 and the council is regu-
larly updating its procedures,113 but not in a manner that has satisfied the calls 
for reform. This has been made apparent because calls persist for both kinds of 
reform. If it is possible for the council’s working methods to undergo develop-
ments routinely, and if there is a widespread consensus among states about 
the need for reform, what then is holding up the process? Why are procedures 
not changed in manners that satisfy the vast body of UN member states’ calls 
for reform?
One of the predominant explanations is to place the blame on the P5 
countries.114 Observers of the debate might wonder why P5 states have 
109   Mahbubani, The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World; Mahbubani, 
“Council Reform and the Emerging Powers”; Ramesh Thakur et al., “What Is Equitable 
Geographic Representation in the Twenty-First Century,” 1999; Langmore and Thakur, 
“The Elected but Neglected Security Council Members.”
110   Schwartzberg, “Towards a More Representative and Effective Security Council,” 99.
111   Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council Membership, 157.
112   Luck, “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress,” 48.
113   Schaefer, “Reforming the United Nations Security Council: Feasibility or Utopia?,” 89; 
Nadin, UN Security Council Reform, 113.
114   Mahbubani, The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World; Weiss, “The 
Illusion of UN Security Council Reform”; Weiss and Young, “Compromise and Credibility: 
Security Council Reform?,” 2005; Weiss, “A Pipe Dream? Reforming the United Nations.”; 
Thakur et al., “What Is Equitable Geographic Representation in the Twenty-First Century”; 
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occasionally made public their recognition of the need for reform, and how 
this fits with the P5 seemingly being responsible for holding up the process. 
Explanations which identify the P5 as roadblocks respond to such objections 
by pointing to the difference between official and unofficial diplomacy. One 
example given by Mahbubani, is that China supports its fellow BRICS115 alli-
ance members India and Brazil’s campaigns for UNSC permanency,116 yet 
unofficially promotes discontent with the veto system. This is being done to 
strengthen the camp of reform voices that seeks abolition of the veto, incit-
ing antagonisms within the debate and thereby preventing the process from 
progressing.117 Moreover, there is the consensus alluded to earlier, that official 
support of UNSC reform is mandatory,118 which explains why P5 states act in 
accordance with this culture publicly, while pursuing their real agenda behind 
the scenes.
Another explanation points out that the prospect for reform is prevented 
by regional rivalries. The G4, by many considered as main drivers for reform, 
is opposed by the UfC group,119 an alliance whose key agenda appears to be 
the prevention of G4 ascension to permanency.120 Generally, disagreements 
among countries about who should achieve more influence and how they 
should get it prevails,121 and national interests obscure countries’ potential will 
to support reform proposals.122 Weiss, for example, who places P5 opposition 
at the top of the list of reasons for non-reform, acknowledges that “member 
Ramesh Thakur, “United Nations Security Council Reform,” African Security Review 13, 
no. 3 (2004): 66–74, https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2004.9627305; Langmore and Thakur, 
“The Elected but Neglected Security Council Members”; Gould and Rablen, “Reform of 
the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency.”
115   Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
116   “2014 Fortaleza Declaration,” accessed March 20, 2019, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs 
/140715-leaders.html.
117   Mahbubani, The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World, 239.
118   Schaefer, “Reforming the United Nations Security Council: Feasibility or Utopia?,” 62.
119   Membership of this group is not always easy to know fully, but it is led by Italy and 
Pakistan and also includes Canada, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, Mexico, 
South Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey.
120   Nadin, UN Security Council Reform; Swart and von Freiesleben, Security Council Reform 
from 1945 to September 2013. Hosli et al., “Squaring the Circle? Collective and Distributive 
Effects of United Nations Security Council Reform”; Fassbender, “Pressure for Security 
Council Refrom”; Bourantonis, “The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform”; 
Zacher, “The Conundrums of International Power Sharing: The Politics of Security 
Council Reform.”
121   Fassbender, “Pressure for Security Council Refrom,” 344.
122   Nadin, UN Security Council Reform, 48.
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states of the Global South are unlikely to any agreement among themselves”.123 
No one attempts to negate the logic behind either the P5 or certain alliance 
groups being proposed as key actors of prevention. Authors tend to subscribe 
to one explanation over the other, but most recognise the validity of both.
Another explanation is that the UN system itself is perhaps the most signifi-
cant hindrance factor, e.g., via the veto-system or the demand for a two-thirds 
majority in the GA for charter amendments.124
Luck has proposed that “[among academics] there is nothing close to a 
consensus diagnosis of what ails the council”.125 I have argued that a tendency 
towards agreement, or at least the lack of entrenched positions, prevail when it 
comes to thoughts about what primarily causes a decrease in council-legitimacy 
(insufficient representation in relation to the geopolitical landscape), and 
about which (f)actors currently prevent reform (P5 and regional rivalries). The 
central divide in the debate exists between the preferred two modes of reform.
Everyone wants a better functioning UNSC to the benefit of international 
relations and everyone hope for ensuing global peace. Ostensibly, there is a 
growing predisposition to propose that a better functioning council and the 
positive consequences thereof, is primarily achievable via a focus on efficiency 
through a working methods reform. This conviction leads to the negation of 
the wishes of, if not the majority then at least many UN member states, and 
encourages reform approaches which secludes structural change from being 
the reform mode through which improvement of the council is pursued. 
Still the emphasis on recommending working methods reform has not com-
pletely overtaken the academic debate, and the field to this day, remains well 
balanced. Nonetheless, continued research is needed, that from the outset, will 
seek to investigate how a structural reform could happen. This is a preferable 
alternative to fearing, as Klabbers points out, that a focus on structural reform 
might convey the notion that the council as a system does not work at all.126
123   Thomas G. Weiss and Karen E. Young, “Compromise and Credibility: Security Council 
Reform?,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 2 (2005): 135, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010605054632.
124   Hosli and Dörfler, “Why Is Change so Slow? Assessing Prospects for United Nations 
Security Council Reform”; Thomas G Weiss, What’s Wrong with the United Nations and 
How to Fix It, 2. ed. (Cambridge: Polity press, 2012); Richard Falk, “The Outlook for UN 
Reform: Necessary, but Impossible,” in Between Sovereignty and Global Governance—
The United Nations, the State and Civil Society, ed. Albert J Paolini, Anthony P Jarvis, and 
Christian Reus-Smit (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 359.
125   Luck, UN Security Council -Practice and Promise, 1:126.
126   Jan Klabbers, “The Politics of Institutional Reform,” in United Nations Reforn and the 
New Collective Security, ed. Peter G Danchin and Horst Fischer (Cambridge: Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 93.
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8 Not Writing of Structural Reform—a Way Forward?
All enlargement plans put forward to date are fundamentally flawed and 
offer a false hope of efficiency through representation.127
Davis’ claim is harsh, but it reflects the notion of chances for structural reform 
being shaky, and that this belief is widespread.128 Nonetheless, in 1965, a struc-
tural reform materialised despite strong opposition from powerful states,129 a 
precedent to keep in mind when judging what is possible. All else being equal, 
a structural reform necessitates a working methods reform, as the council 
then would need to adjust to a new size and therefore implement, e.g., new 
procedures for it voting processes.130 Thus, the potential benefits of a working 
methods reform can be considered a part of how the impact of structural reform 
is evaluated—structural reform can be a catalyst for working methods reform.
Focus on how aspects of the two kinds of reform can positively impact one 
another is present,131 but under-emphasised in the debate. Even though many 
propose reforms of both types, such theses do not start with a focus on seeking 
out mutually reinforcing dynamics. Nadin,132 a tenacious proponent for work-
ing methods reform, concludes his work by, reluctantly and out of necessity, 
suggesting reform models that include both structural and working methods 
aspects. However, he does not discuss if and how aspects of structural reform 
can impact the council’s working methods.
Working methods proponents tend to downplay the positive potential in 
structural reform models. They fear “that deficits in working methods would 
be even more apparent in an expanded council”.133 Hassler sees structural 
127   Davis, “An Unrealistic Proposal: An Argument Agaist The Enlargement of the United 
Nations Security Council,” 37.
128   Weiss, “The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform”; Nadin, UN Security Council Reform; 
Fassbender, “On the Boulevard of Broken Dreams,” International Organizations Law 
Review 2 (2005): 391–402; Hosli and Dörfler, “The United Nations Security Council the 
Challenge of Reform”; Hosli and Dörfler, “Why Is Change so Slow? Assessing Prospects for 
United Nations Security Council Reform.”
129   Bourantonis, “The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform,” 28.
130   The process of agreeing on the 70th GA IGN outcome, ‘the elements of convergence’ dem-
onstrates that agreeing on what constitutes a majority and how such rules can transfer 
from the current (size of the) council to an enlarged council is not a simple matter.
131   Kemal Dervis and Ceren Ozer, A Better G Lobalization, 2005; Gould and Rablen, “Reform 
of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency”; Ville Lättilä and Aleksi 
Ylönen, “United Nations Security Council Reform Revisited: A Proposal,” Diplomacy and 
Statecraft 30, no. 1 (2019): 164–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2019.1557423.
132   Nadin, UN Security Council Reform.
133   Luck, UN Security Council -Practice and Promise, 1:122.
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reform as a possibility only after the implementation of working methods 
reform, not as a consequence, but as an add-on to appease those vying for 
increased representation.134 Blum, a moderate working methods advocate, 
notes a potential dynamic between the two modes of reform, but in a nega-
tive sense. She argues, that failed council enlargement will likely lead to failed 
improvements in working methods,135 but Blum does not explore such inter-
connections. Considerations about procedural benefits from structural reform, 
e.g., improved dynamics between permanent and non-permanent members,136 
I believe, deserve a higher degree of attention in the debate.
The case for structural reform is closely tied to the notion of this mode being 
backed by many UN member states. Whether a majority of states essentially 
want a structural reform is debatable. Claiming it as fact necessitates the 
caveat that majority support likely only exists when it comes to an unspecified 
model of structural reform (where no one’s rival ascends to higher places). If 
this were not the case, then a concrete reform resolution would probably have 
been put to the vote in the GA in recent years, which is a feat that not even the 
G4 has attempted. Still, scholars from both sides of the structure/working meth-
ods divide often mention structural reform as being supported by a majority 
of states.137
A strenuous critique of the structural reform advocacy is found mainly in the 
arguments coming from tenacious working methods proponents. Structural 
reform is called “a flawed approach”,138 “a widespread shortcoming”,139 and an 
approach supported by “unsophisticated arguments”.140 The level of recogni-
tion within academia about the existence of at least a high level of support 
among UN member states for structural reform of the council, supports the 
need for continued efforts to investigate this path to reform. Such research 
134   Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council Membership, 202.
135   Blum, “Proposals for UN Security Council Reform,” 648.
136   Mahbubani, “Permanent and Elected Council Members.”
137   Weiss, “The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform”; Jonas von Freiesleben, “Reform of 
the Security Council,” Governing and Managing Change at the United Nations 4 (2013): 
1–22; Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte, “Conclusion: The Security Council and a World in 
Crisis,” 866; Davis, “An Unrealistic Proposal: An Argument Agaist The Enlargement of 
the United Nations Security Council”; Langmore and Thakur, “The Elected but Neglected 
Security Council Members”; Zacher, “The Conundrums of International Power Sharing: 
The Politics of Security Council Reform,” 217.
138   Davis, “An Unrealistic Proposal: An Argument Agaist The Enlargement of the United 
Nations Security Council,” 36–37.
139   Schaefer, “Reforming the United Nations Security Council: Feasibility or Utopia?,” 86.
140   Nadin, UN Security Council Reform, 72.
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could perhaps test if the presented critique is valid, or if specific approaches 
have yet to be investigated before they can be written off.
There is weighty truth to the argument often used in favour of working 
methods reform that the council must be an able body to uphold (pursue) 
international peace. Consequently, reform emphases cannot exclusively tar-
get increased representation, without paying heed to the risks of further tying 
the Gordian knot currently manifest, both in the reform process and in the 
performance of the council concerning crises like the Syrian Civil War. Still, 
more research is needed that seek to meet Paul’s call for a united front (civil 
society, Academia, NGO’s, and States) to increase the pressure for a transforma-
tive reform, even one that requires charter change.141
9 Convergence as a Way Forward? Towards Africa?
Sam Daws’ statement that “There is a risk that the United Nations will be weak-
ened by an expansion of the membership of the UN Security Council. There is 
an equal risk that it will be weakened by the maintenance of the status quo”,142 
undergirds the need for a balanced field of studies of UNSC reform.
To balance the two main lines of thinking regarding a reform, the notion 
of convergence might be a source of inspiration. During the 70th UNGA, the 
IGN produced a document on ‘The Elements of Convergence’.143 The content 
described how the IGN had managed to agree upon a set of particular con-
vergences concerning two out of the five official vital areas of reform focus 
(A/62/557), as designated in 2008 GA. The two areas were 1) The relationship 
between the Council and the General Assembly, and 2) The size of an enlarged 
Council and the working methods of the Council. Managing to produce a docu-
ment with agreements on paper was a “significant step forward”.144 Not the 
least because of the opposition in place during the negotiations, but also 
because certain powerful countries felt that the previous year’s negotiations 
had led to a document which was too specific. Most importantly, the conver-
gence paper includes that the council’s membership should be expanded to 
between twenty-one and twenty-seven seats. Cilliers, is sceptical concerning 
any impact from ‘The Elements of Convergence,’ and sees the potential of the 
141   Paul, Of Foxes and Chickens—Oligarchy and Global Power in the UN Security Council, 160.
142   Daws, “Security Council Reform: The Dual Risks,” 1.
143   The President of the General Assembly, “Statement by the President of the General 
Assembly,” 2016.
144   Langmore and Thakur, “The Elected but Neglected Security Council Members,” 105.
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IGN’s work leading to a reform as being non-existing.145 Regardless of whether 
the IGN’s concluding produce was a success or not, inspiration can be drawn 
from Luck’s observance that in the UN “[…] political convergence precedes 
institutional change and not the other way around”,146 and consequently aim 
for elements of convergence within academia between structural and working 
methods reform advocacies.
Perhaps, research could start by agreeing with Nadin, that member states 
should drop their maximalist positions.147 Correspondingly, scholars could 
look to the significance of the African group’s (maximalist) calls for expansion 
of both types of council seats. It is close to impossible to achieve the needed 
two-thirds support for charter amendments from the GA without including 
the fifty-four African states—the kingmakers according to Nadin.
Researchers that want to pump fresh blood into the debate could look into 
the internal disagreements within the African Group about which African 
states should be granted permanent council seats.148 This political feature can 
be utilised to reconsider approaches to the group’s demands for permanent 
African seats with veto rights. Correspondingly, analyses could investigate 
how African countries, which also represents The Global South, could be 
catered to in a manner that would strengthen their own, as well as others’ 
views of the council’s legitimacy. Perhaps, there is potential in seeking a 
higher number of both types of African seats than those proposed in the 
Ezulwini Consensus,149 as a way to dissipate the calls for African veto rights. 
The Ezulwini paper calls for permanent African seats with veto rights, but 
at the same time mentions that the African Union is opposed to the principle 
of the veto. It could be possible that this paradox of a stance is an open door for 
mediation. Structural reform without veto expansion could help prevent a P5 
interception and forced landing of the process. Moreover, it seems as if many 
African countries are more interested in having increased influence when it 
comes to peacekeeping missions on the African continent, than they are in 
obtaining the veto right.
Any country that currently possesses a veto right (excluding France and the 
UK because they have stopped using theirs) are essentially able to prevent 
the global community from acting against its national interest. The veto sys-
tem then, is more a reflection of the geopolitical strengths of USA, Russia, and 
145   Cilliers, “Global Trends Analysis,” 7.
146   Luck, “How Not to Reform the United Nations,” 410–11.
147   Nadin, UN Security Council Reform, 117.
148   Lydia Swart and Cile Pace, “Changing the Composition of the Security Council: Is There a 
Viable Solution?,” Center for UN Reform Education, no. March (2015).
149   The African Unions common position on UNSC reform from 2005.
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China, than it is instrumental in reinforcing them. Therefore, when academics 
present their preferences for UNSC reform, we could perhaps point out, that 
no one member state can presently measure up to the military status of USA, 
Russia or China.150 Consequently, the addition of veto rights to more countries 
would be a symbolic act more than a measure of equalising the current zenith 
of global power. There is no need to write of that even as a status symbol; the 
veto remains in high demand. However, being present in the same group as 
those currently possessing the veto is, as mentioned, likely perceived by aspi-
rants for council membership, as immensely valuable.151
Despite all the debates and rounds of negotiations in the UN, all the research, 
and suggestions on reform from academia, the issue remains unresolved. The 
proposed notion of convergence between the two lines of thinking found in 
academia is meant as an inspiration for the investigation of new approaches.152 
Luck was surely right when he wrote that the proponents of structural reform 
need to do better in explaining how an expanded council would perform bet-
ter, and those opposing structural reform in answering if no structural reform 
now, then when would the time be ripe?153 Therefore, research is needed that 
aligns the widespread quest for structural reform among member states with 
the critical observations from academia about the need to pay attention to 
how reform will impact the efficiency of the council.
150   Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte, “Conclusion: The Security Council and a World in Crisis,” 
867; David L Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the 
Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3.
151   Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker, “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? 
Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations,” Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 5 
(2006): 905–28; James Raymond Vreeland and Axel Dreher, The Political Economy of 
the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence, ed. James Raymond Vreeland 
(New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
152   Edward De Bono, Lateral Thinking: An Introduction (London: Vermilion, 2014).
153   Luck, UN Security Council -Practice and Promise, 1:126.
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